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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UDHR
JUAN E MtNDEZ*
1. INTRODUCTION
Numerous atrocities and affronts to the dignity of human
beings continue to happen sixty years after the world agreed to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"). In itself, that is
a sobering reminder of the challenges ahead, but it does not
diminish the importance of the landmark that we commemorate.
The UDHR was conceived both as a guiding principle to orient the
behavior of governments and as a fundamental agreement across
cultures and ideologies regarding the inherent dignity of each
human person and the equality among them. In assigning to the
Declaration the nature of a "common standard of achievement,"
the framers may have wanted to indicate these two different, but
not incompatible meanings. It is a common standard in the sense
that the rights and principles enumerated are an irreducible
minimum applicable under any circumstance and not subject to
any form of relativism -cultural, ideological, etc. It is a standard to
the effect that behavior of governments can and will be judged in
comparison to it. The reference to a standard of achievement is
meant to signify two things: (1) that, as of 1948, there is no going
back on these principles through interpretation, rationalization,
exceptionalism, or exigencies of the circumstances; and (2) that full
compliance with these standards was not a reality in 1948. In this
sense, the UDHR was meant, at the time it was passed, to indicate
a blueprint for how governments should relate to their citizens,
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and that such a blueprint was to become a reality through specific
government action and international cooperation over time.
Even if full compliance with the UDHR is far from being
achieved six decades later, the Declaration is still the source of
much of the progress that has indeed happened in this period.
Many governments do indeed try to adjust their conduct towards
their citizens to the principles embodied in the UDHR. The UDHR
is the inspiration for advanced human rights treaties, for decisions
of courts and other organs that have indeed moved the standards
forward, and for the creation of multilateral mechanisms that
afford redress to victims of human rights abuses when remedies
are unavailable in the domestic jurisdiction. More importantly, the
Declaration is the ultimate source of legitimacy for collective action
in the realm of human rights by States other than the territorial
government, by the United Nations, and by other organs of the
international community, as well as by a growing and ever more
influential movement of international civil society. In that sense,
perhaps the most important reason to celebrate its commemoration
is that the Declaration has given birth to a movement across
nations and cultures and has become an indispensable factor in
policy formulation and decision-making. The human rights
movement is now a rich and diverse network of government
agencies and officials, multilateral organizations and units, and of
civil society organizations that strive to promote, protect, defend,
and fulfill human rights across the globe.
2. THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
The human rights doctrine has developed extensively since
1948, keeping pace with the growth and richness of the human
rights movement. Throughout the stages of that development, the
UDHR has remained effective and current. In the 1950s and 1960s,
emphasis was placed on the need to make the UDHR principles
legally binding and to clarify their meaning in relation to State
obligations. This "standard setting" stage culminated with the
adoption and later extensive ratification of the two International
Covenants: (1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") and (2) the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). The "standard setting"
stage continued with important treaties such as the Convention
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Against Torture and, most recently, a Convention on Enforced
Disappearances, open for ratification only in the last year.
A second stage consisted of the effort to build mechanisms able
to identify specific cases of non-compliance could bring them to the
attention of international advisory, investigatory or adjudicatory
bodies, which could provide an effective remedy to the victims.
This "implementation" stage included efforts not only at the
United Nations, but also through regional inter-governmental
organizations. This stage, however, is not complete, because there
is a vast discrepancy between mechanisms - in terms of
effectiveness, geographic coverage and jurisprudential output.
Nevertheless, progress in this area is unmistakable, even if also
very uneven.
In recent decades, the human rights movement has shifted in
its efforts to apply human rights principles to situations of armed
conflict and political violence, stemming from the objective reality
that much human suffering is caused not only by State agents but
also by non-State actors that apply violence in order to achieve
power. As a result, a third stage in the development of human
rights law and practice is "international criminal justice" - an
attempt to hold individuals criminally responsible for human
rights violations of such widespread or systematic nature that they
constitute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.
Of course, the foregoing identification of stages in the
development of human rights is overly schematic. In practice,
standard setting, implementation of State responsibility, and the
international criminal justice regime all continue today in different
forms and huge gaps and challenges affect each one of them. From
the perspective of standard setting, the most recent trend is to
apply universal principles to the particular circumstances of
categories of victims like women, children, indigenous
populations, discrete ethnic or religious minorities, and persons
with disabilities. This trend does not negate the universal
character of the rights enumerated in the UDHR, but rather fleshes
out the particular ways in which such rights must be applied to
persons and collectivities in special circumstances. In this sense,
the most recent instruments enrich the human rights doctrine by
giving special meaning to the cardinal principle of equality and non-
discrimination in the exercise of rights.
In the realm of implementation of State responsibility, much
could be said for the contributions of organs like the European and
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, the Inter-American and
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African Commissions of Human Rights, and several of the U.N.
treaty bodies and "special procedures" that are Charter-based. To
highlight only one possible contribution of these bodies to the
human rights canon, it deserves notice that their collective
judgments, reports and commentaries have resulted in the creation
of a very rich doctrine of due process of law - specifying what
procedures States must establish to ensure that persons have a
right to be heard and to defend their interests, not only in criminal
proceedings instituted against them, but in all administrative or
judicial instances that affect the enjoyment of rights.
The recent progress in international criminal justice deserves
special mention. For years, the international human rights
movement adhered to the notion that the UDHR and its progeny
applied to the responsibility of States for actions of its agents that
violated its standards. In that respect, the punishment of
individuals who abused their authority as State agents was
considered to fall within the realm of domestic law and was not
included among the remedies demanded by international law.
Likewise, crimes committed by armed and organized groups
outside the control of the State were considered crimes of the
domestic jurisdiction and therefore also outside the scope of
concern of the international community. This interpretation was
and is formally correct-and in the case of some inter-
governmental bodies is strictly a matter of mandate-but it
ignored the reality that non-State actors who challenge the State
sometimes commit atrocities that are equally grave in their effects
on human beings. In this misplaced orthodoxy, the human rights
movement was offering a flank to those who accused it of
"selective indignation," and a ready-made rhetorical excuse for
governments who wished to ignore its denunciations and
demands.
In the 1980s, human rights organizations monitoring and
reporting in situations of armed conflict started applying the laws
of war, or international humanitarian law, to all sides. In addition
to preserving their impartiality and objectivity -both crucial to
their credibility and effectiveness -this expansion amplified not
only the universe of beneficiaries but also the legal and moral basis
for human rights advocacy. Indeed, the laws of war have an even
longer lineage than international human rights law and are better
codified (most recently in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their two Additional Protocols of 1977). They contain the same
main purpose as the UDHR and human rights treaties - the
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protection of the human person from abuse and violence. In that
sense, they constitute a code of conduct for armies and combatants
and a set of fundamental rights for civilians caught in the special
circumstance of an armed conflagration.
The Geneva Conventions squarely spell out the obligation to
investigate, prosecute, and punish the most egregious violations of
the laws of war. If at first it was thought that that obligation
applied only to international wars, for the last two decades the
norm has expanded to apply also to wars not of an international
character. For that reason, the international human rights
movement incorporated the "struggle against impunity" in its
arsenal of demands for redress and remedies, as a consequence of
establishing that a violation had indeed occurred. More or less
contemporaneously, military dictatorships and authoritarian
regimes were being replaced with elected governments in the most
recent wave of democratization. The newly democratic societies
confronted legacies of massive or systematic human rights
violations and the open wounds they had left in the social fabric,
and a powerful demand arose from victims, and from society at
large, that those legacies should be dealt with appropriately. To
the extent that many of those crimes were crimes against humanity
under international law, they were equivalent to war crimes
because they triggered an obligation to investigate, prosecute and
punish them. Starting in the societies where these tectonic shifts
were occurring, civil society turned its attention to advocacy for
effective means to break the cycle of impunity. In due course,
those demands were upheld by decisions of international judicial
bodies. In this regard, a central tenet of human rights advocacy is
now the "right to justice" - a legitimate demand by the victims and
society to see justice done in accordance with principles of fair trial
and due process.
In the 1990s the international community borrowed a page
from these experiences and incorporated justice through
international cooperation and specially created international
courts, like those for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.
Some saw the creation of these ad hoc courts by the Security
Council as a poor substitute for more robust action to stop the
killings, or as embarrassed mea culpas for not taking more timely
action. In fact, the integrity, independence and professionalism of
the jurists selected for the tribunals' prominent positions soon
turned them into formidable instruments of justice. As their
credibility grew, the international community turned to the
20091 1161
U. Pa. 1. In t'l L.
creation of a permanent international criminal court. The debates
sponsored by the United Nations enjoyed ample participation from
member States and attracted the interest and activism of a strong
movement of civil society. The adoption of the Rome Statute for an
International Criminal Court ("ICC") in July 1998 is the turning
point in the evolution of the human rights canon on two major
grounds: (1) the international community gave itself an instrument
to break the cycle of impunity when States more directly
responsible are unwilling or unable to afford justice; and (2)
participating States oblige themselves to cooperate with the ICC
and in so doing acknowledge that genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity trigger an affirmative obligation to
investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible.
3. NEw HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
Accountability for massive or systematic crimes is one of the
new horizons of human rights protection. There are others, of
course. Chief among them is the challenge to implement economic,
social, and cultural rights with the same level of effectiveness and
success that the movement has achieved with respect to civil and
political rights. At bottom, this challenge reflects the need to
remain faithful to the broad agreement across cultures and
ideologies that gave rise to the UDHR in 1948. It is also a way to
abandon the idea of "generations of rights" which, whatever the
original intent of the authors, has resulted in practice of
considering economic, social, and cultural rights as "second
category" rights. The challenge consists in finding ways to make
"progressive realization" (the standard used in the ICESCR) more
than a platitude or aspiration, through effective public policy
measures. It also demands an effort of imagination and legal
thinking to devise formulas by which these rights can be
"justiciable," i.e., subject to specific court-ordered redress in case of
violation. But it cannot be denied that the difficulty does not stem
simply from an ideological preference for civil and political rights
and a neglect of social justice concerns. There are objective reasons
why economic, social, and cultural rights are more difficult to
implement and fulfill than civil and political rights, or that their
implementation requires a different path. The refinement of the
principle of equality and non-discrimination possibly offers some
clues to make these rights justiciable, and constitutional courts in
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young democracies (South Africa, Colombia, Argentina) are
showing the way to their effective realization.
Another "new horizon" of human rights protection is related to
the struggle against impunity, and more broadly to the idea of the
right to a remedy as a dominating principle in current human
rights law. It is generally called "transitional justice" and it
concentrates on the appropriate response societies and States owe
to their citizens in the face of a legacy of massive or systematic
abuses. It comprises, of course, the various forms of international
criminal justice mentioned earlier. But it goes further to focus also
on efforts of domestic courts to live up to the States' obligation not
to let those crimes go unpunished. In addition, transitional justice
attempts to bridge the inevitable "impunity gaps" left by the
impossibility to cover all potential events, all potential defendants
and all potential victims of crimes that, by definition, are massive
or systematic. In this regard, transitional justice learns from the
practices and policies of societies that have recently experienced
transitions from dictatorship to democracy or from conflict to
peace, and offers suggestions to adapt those experiences to new
challenges, particularly in the areas of truth-seeking, prosecutions,
reparations for the victims, and institutional reform.
Transitional justice is sometimes mistakenly accused of
promoting a token form of justice or of settling for "justice light" or
for "soft" versions of accountability. It is true that some
government leaders promote their version of a false and forced
"reconciliation" or argue in favor of vague notions of "restorative
justice" as alternatives for what they consider retributive justice.
When they do so by invoking transitional justice they are not
acting in good faith to comply with legal and moral obligations;
their proposals are window dressing for policies of impunity.
Serious practitioners of transitional justice insist on good faith
understanding of the State's obligations in the face of massive or
systematic crimes. They make it clear that criminal prosecutions,
at least those bearing the highest responsibility, have to be central
to any program to restore faith in institutions and give victims
access to justice. Of course, transitional justice does not end there
because it stresses a comprehensive, balanced, integrated approach
to justice, to truth, to reparations and to institutional reform.
In this context, it is worth dwelling on the concept of
"reconciliation," especially because it has so frequently been
misused or misunderstood. In some countries, notably in Latin
America, proponents of impunity have frequently cloaked their
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arguments in the euphemism of reconciliation. This has been the
justification for blanket amnesties and for refusals to cooperate
with truth commissions. Under the guise of reconciliation, clearly
identified perpetrators of egregious crimes are allowed to retain
their positions of power and influence in the same institutions that
were the instruments of their atrocities. It is no wonder then that
Latin American victims and human rights activists react to the
word "reconciliation" with rejection. Nevertheless, it is imperative
to distinguish between this false reconciliation imposed between
victims and perpetrators, and the reconciliation between factions in
a political or ideological battle that is necessary to set the country
toward a new, more humane and democratic way of settling
political differences. The latter version of reconciliation is the
ultimate objective of a policy of transitional justice, and it can only
be achieved if the country embarks on an honest, courageous effort
to reckon with the past through truth, justice, reparations and
institutional reform.
In addition, it must be recognized that in some places the
atrocities had a distinct ethnic, racial or religious dimension, like in
the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and now Darfur. In those cases, a
comprehensive policy of transitional justice will have to deal with
all four avenues of accountability, but in addition it will be
necessary to establish certain other initiatives that can fairly be
labeled "reconciliation." By these initiatives, I allude to the need
for talks and arrangements between ethnic groups for purposes of
property restitution, land rights, water rights, grazing rights and
the right to return to original places of abode. These very specific
reconciliation initiatives are necessary -together with the classic
transitional justice mechanisms - if we are to build a future in
which the next generations of a certain ethnicity are not to be
blamed for the crimes committed in the past by those who claimed
to act on its behalf.
Transitional justice thus encompasses most of the actions and
operations that are necessary to bring a country back from the
effects of indiscriminate violence and civilian victimization that so
frequently characterize modem day wars. Institutions and
procedures devised to discover and disclose the truth, as well as to
organize effective prosecutions that are impartial, independent and
fundamentally fair to the defendant as well as to the victims are
central to the effort to reorganize the State after conflict. The same
can be said of policy decisions to offer reparations to victims that
are non-discriminatory and whose scope and quantum recognizes
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their plight and their dignity, and of the necessary rebuilding of
armed and security forces, the judiciary and other institutions of
the State so that in the future citizens can be expected to trust them.
In this sense, through transitional justice practices the human
rights movement enters the realm of post-conflict reconstruction
and contributes from its unique perspective to evolving notions of
human development. Furthermore, because the debate about
transitional justice usually begins well before the end of the
conflict, human rights activists now work constructively with
conflict resolution specialists and humanitarian relief
organizations. The substance of such conversations can help
ensure that peace negotiations incorporate the legitimate demands
of victims for justice without provoking more conflict and more
human rights abuse. Justice is, in this concept, an ingredient of a
peace that has a better chance to be durable, precisely because it
consults the interests of those affected by both war and peace.
4. CHALLENGES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT
For all the progress that has been accomplished since the
enactment of the UDHR, there are still challenges that continue to
bedevil the human rights movement. Prevention of violations is
perhaps the most important one. Based on the UDHR and other
instruments, the international human rights movement has
devised a very effective way to respond to violations as they
happen, through permanent monitoring and reporting and, more
recently, by paying special attention to remedies. Even as the
movement was in its infancy, the idea that there should be a way to
prevent violations from happening in the first place was a focal
point, especially in the wake of the tremendous -and generally
irreparable - human suffering caused by violations of human
rights. As the movement perfected a methodology of monitoring
and reporting that relied on impartiality and objectivity,
predictions of bad behavior by governments and regimes had to be
avoided, lest it be accused of bias against them. This trend
undoubtedly resulted in the professionalism and credibility of
human rights organizations, but it did little to equip them to
engage in effective prevention.
There is no question that reliability and timeliness in reporting
human rights violations as they happen does contribute to
awareness and reaction, and in this fashion can be turned into
effective preventive tools. But prevention requires two or three
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additional steps beyond accurate analysis of facts on the ground. It
requires careful research of trends toward deterioration and deep
familiarity with the background to each conflict. With these tools
effective early warning can be accomplished, assuming that such
warning can be directed to organs and authorities that are in fact in
a position to address deteriorating situations. Yet, even early
warning is not sufficient to prevent mass atrocities; it is also
necessary to bring forward suggestions for early action that are
reasonably tailored to alter the course of events so that impending
atrocities may be averted.
The inability of the international community to prevent the
catastrophes in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s, its
helplessness in the face of millions of deaths in the Democratic
Republic of Congo in the late 1990s, and the tepid and inconsistent
response to the ongoing massacres in Darfur in this decade have
given rise to a new preoccupation with prevention, at least with
prevention of genocide and mass atrocity. Some democratic States
like Sweden and Switzerland have championed the idea that
genocide can and should be prevented, and have fostered rigorous
thinking among academics and activists and initial steps within the
United Nations to incorporate prevention of genocide and mass
atrocity into the regular operations of the Secretariat. I was
privileged to be asked by Kofi Annan to be his first Special Advisor
on the Prevention of Genocide, a task that I discharged on a part-
time basis between 2004 and 2007. It is gratifying to report that the
recommendations arising from my experiment in genocide
prevention have been implemented, and now the office has a full-
time Special Representative, a better-defined mandate and more
human and material resources.
The ideas about an operative concept of prevention of genocide
have immediate precedent in two parallel trends in the 1990s and
in the present decade. One is the promotion of a "culture of
prevention" within the United Nations. Although the early focus
was on prevention of conflict, the principles developed in those
early studies have been immensely helpful in their application to
impending mass atrocities. The other trend is the growth of a
network of genocide scholars who are erudite experts on past
genocides but also are intent on drawing lessons learned from the
study of those human catastrophes. These genocide scholars have
worked with governments and international organizations in
promoting a better interpretation of unfolding events. They are to
be credited with drafting indicators, predictable stages of genocide,
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and accelerating or containing factors drawn from those
experiences. There is ample debate about whether early warning is
crucial to effective action, as many scholars maintain that factors
leading to genocide develop slowly and at plain sight. They
demonstrate that most recent genocides or genocide-like situations
were predictable, and in fact predicted, and that the lack of
warning was not a factor in the inability to respond effectively to
those signals.
Nevertheless, early warning remains a central theme of
preventive action, and the indicators and signs gleaned from past
experiences are an indispensable tool in the arsenal of prevention.
Lack of political will to act is almost always the main reason for
genocides to happen before our eyes. But early warning and early
action can contribute to form the political will that fails to exist in
the abstract.
Experience also shows that it is unwise to engage in endless
debates about whether events unfolding in a comer of the world
constitute genocide or something different, as in the discussions
that have precluded more effective responses to the Darfur crisis.
The determination of whether some killings constitute genocide
depends largely on the perpetrators' intent to destroy an ethnic,
religious, racial or national-origin community in whole or in part.
It is legitimate to distill that intent from the facts on the ground,
but that task should be left to courts of law that can act after the
fact to impose punishment. It is completely unhelpful to the effort
to prevent some events from deteriorating into genocide. Waiting
to act until all elements of genocide are in place disallows the
prevention of genocide in the first Place. The Secretary-General's
instructions to the Special Advisor specifically ordered me to
refrain from qualifying a situation as genocide. Instead, my
successor and I were instructed to act to prevent mass atrocities
before we can tell whether they will ultimately be genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity or other forms of serious and
massive human rights violations.
Prevention of mass atrocities has been given a large boost by
the emerging norm of "Responsibility to Protect," embodied in the
outcome document of the U.N. Summit Conference of 2005, which
was approved by a large number of heads of State and of
government. That document was later ratified by a General
Assembly resolution, and it was preceded by seminal documents
by highly respected experts, all of which was sponsored by many
democratic governments in the first half of this decade.
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Unfortunately, the doctrine is under serious pushback from some
States' representations in the United Nations, based on the
perspective of near-absolute notions of sovereignty. The dispute
over the meaning of the outcome document is fueled by distrust of
the organs that will make decisions when the responsibility to
protect triggers international action. The debate about the
contours and scope of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is
ongoing and unfortunately it has delayed efforts to make the
doctrine operational in the workings of the United Nations
Secretariat and its field missions. But Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon has created an office of a Special Advisor on this matter,
who works closely with the office of Prevention of Genocide and
leads the ongoing discussions among member States, civil society
and U.N. officials. The doctrine has attracted the interest of the
human rights movement and the development of new advocacy
and research organizations that hold great promise for an effective
use of this evolving norm in the near future.
In the meantime, these early experiences in the prevention of
mass atrocities are yielding some lessons, even if they should be
subject to further study and corroboration with facts on the
ground. In my experience, the international community must
engage in a sustained, unified diplomatic effort to contain the
damage of ongoing conflict and stabilize each situation with a view
to more long-term solutions. This means that coordinated and
simultaneous efforts have to be displayed in four distinct areas: (1)
protection; (2) humanitarian assistance; (3) accountability; and (4)
peace talks. I stress that measures in each area must be
dynamically and flexibly adapted, tailored to shifting situations on
the ground, and coordinated so that they are not subordinated to
each other. Effective action in each of them should not be held
hostage to conditions imposed by recalcitrant governments, such
as was the case in Darfur where the Khartoum regime has
managed to delay progress in each while holding out for
concessions in another.
In this context, protection means the deployment of armed
neutral contingents capable of standing in the path of those who
would attack defenseless civilians. It also means that civilian
observers and advisers must accompany those forces with the
capacity to document violations, bring them to the attention of
local interlocutors and report them up the chain of U.N.
representatives on the ground and at headquarters. Humanitarian
assistance not only reverses the trend towards loss of life but also
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constitutes a measure of protection because of the presence of
specialized civilian personnel that are witness to the facts on the
ground. Accountability is necessary to break the cycle of impunity
for the abuses already committed, because impunity breeds
distrust in the target population and constitutes an incentive for
perpetrators to commit atrocities again. Finally, the underlying
conflict that gave occasion to the situation of impending genocide
must be addressed not only to achieve a fragile cease-fire or truce,
but also to look for solutions to its root causes.
If in the past it was generally believed that peace agreements
always trumped any demands for justice, there is now a clear trend
to find ways in which justice and peace can be integrated to
solutions that certainly will be more complex, but that have a
better chance to achieve a lasting peace. This trend has been fueled
by the normative developments in international justice mentioned
earlier, with the tipping point being the Rome Statute for an
International Criminal Court. The recognition of an obligation to
prosecute mass atrocities and the creation of an institutional
instrument to implement it when States are unwilling or unable to
do so has resulted in a veritable paradigm shift in the efforts to
bring conflicts to a peaceful resolution. Justice is no longer the
poor cousin of peace, to be left behind in order to yield to the
blackmail of perpetrators who will not stop committing atrocities
unless assured of impunity. Justice is now considered a value to be
pursued for its own worth and out of respect for the dignity of
victims, as well as an essential element of peace arrangements
designed with all stakeholders in mind. Undoubtedly, the task of
peacemakers is thus made more complicated, but peacemakers
themselves recognize that conflicts that seem to lend themselves to
apparently easy solutions are precisely the conflicts that are
resumed, perhaps even more savagely, after a brief interlude.
These dilemmas of peace and justice have attracted the human
rights community and have put them in frequent and ongoing
dialogue with humanitarian organizations and with specialists in
conflict resolution and mediation. At the same time, the realization
that full measures of justice will be very difficult to realize under
the best of circumstances have resulted in the need to explore
transitional justice mechanisms to apply a notion of justice that
integrates judicial and non-judicial initiatives with a better chance
to bridge the impunity gap and satisfy the demands of larger
circles of victims.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this evolution of the normative framework of international
law relating to human rights and in the growth of the multi-
cultural international movement that applies it on an ongoing
basis, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has played a
large, indeed immeasurable role. It is significant that a sixty year-
old document has lost nothing of its vitality or significance to
current events and new challenges. Contemporary instruments
like the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide and the Geneva Conventions on the laws of
war are also live instruments of precious force and utility in the
times we live in. Unlike the Genocide Convention, the UDHR is a
comprehensive document designed to deal with every aspect of
life, and freedom of individual and collectivities in peacetime as
well as in states of emergency. The Geneva Conventions are a
codification of previous instruments, and uses and customs of war
developed over centuries, whereas the UDHR is a seminal
instrument that inaugurated a whole new field of international law
about the relationship of the human person to the authority of the
State. Because of these differences, it is remarkable that the UDHR
has not been eclipsed by the subsequent elaboration of its norms
by new treaties. On the contrary, the binding instruments in the
universal as well as in the regional realms have only highlighted
the wisdom of the norms contained in the UDHR.
For this very reason, it is to be expected that the UDHR will
continue for years to come to be a guiding light as we face the
challenges ahead. It will be not only an inspiration but also a
source of authoritative normative force as we build more effective
machineries of redress and protection of human rights, as we
embark on more aggressive promotion of standards through
human rights education, and as we deliver on the promise of
prevention of violations before they occur.
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